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FAST GENERATORS FOR THE
DIFFIE-HELLMAN KEY AGREEMENT PROTOCOL
AND MALICIOUS STANDARDS
BOAZ TSABAN
Abstract. The Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol is based
on taking large powers of a generator of a prime-order cyclic group.
Some generators allow faster exponentiation. We show that to
a large extent, using the fast generators is as secure as using a
randomly chosen generator. On the other hand, we show that if
there is some case in which fast generators are less secure, then
this could be used by a malicious authority to generate a standard
for the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol which has a hidden
trapdoor.
1. Introduction
The Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol [3] is one of the most
celebrated means for two parties, say Alice and Bob, to agree on a
secret key over an insecure communication channel. Alice and Bob
make their computations in some previously fixed cyclic group G with
an agreed generator g. The protocol is defined as follows:
(1) Alice chooses a random1 a ∈ {1, . . . , |G| − 1}, and sends ga to
Bob.
(2) Bob chooses a random b ∈ {1, . . . , |G| − 1}, and sends gb to
Alice.
The agreed key is gab, which can be computed both by Alice ((gb)a)
and by Bob ((ga)b).
Due to the Pohlig-Hellman attack [6] (which exploits the Chinese
Remainder Theorem), it is preferred that the order of the group be
prime, which is henceforth assumed.
Consider, for example, the case g ∈ F∗q where q is prime. Let p be the
(prime) order of the generated group G = 〈g〉 ≤ F∗q . Computing g
x for
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1Throughout the paper, by random we mean uniformly random and independent
of earlier samples.
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x ∈ {1, . . . , p− 1} consists of squaring and multiplying. If g = 2, then
the multiplication operation amounts to shifting and taking modular
reduction. For h ∈ F∗q ,
2h mod q =
{
2h h < q/2
2h− q q/2 ≤ h
which is computationally negligible in comparison to multiplying by a
random g. In standard square-and-multiply implementations this saves
about 33% of the computational complexity of evaluating gx (in fact,
squaring can often be done more efficiently than general multiplication,
so this saves more). Thus, if 2 ∈ G, we may wish to chose it as our
generator. If 2 6∈ G, we can use other generators for which similar
comments apply (like 3, 5, etc.).
We show that, in the common interpretation, this can be done with
no loss of security. On the other hand, we show that if there is a
conceivable way to make some generators weaker than random ones,
then this can be used by an authority of standards to find parameters
for the Diffie-Hellman protocol with a trapdoor allowing the authority
to exploit these weaknesses. In the appendix we give an example of a
public-key cryptosystem based on this phenomenon.
The results also apply to choices of efficient generators in other
groups, e.g., low hamming weight polynomials in F∗qm , or low weight
elements in hyper-elliptic curves.
2. A fast generator is almost as secure
Let G = 〈g〉 be a cyclic group of prime order p. Let f ∈ G be
any element except the identity. Then f is a generator of G. In the
intended application, f is chosen so that the computation of fx is more
efficient (we call f a fast generator), or that its usage is convenient for
some other reason.
Fix h ∈ G. An algorithm D¯h (depending on h) is said to solve the
Diffie-Hellman Problem (DHP) for base h if, for each x, y ∈ {1, . . . , p−
1}, D¯h(h
x, hy) = hxy.
Henceforth, for a number r ∈ {1, . . . , p− 1}, r−1 mod p denotes the
element s of {1, . . . , p− 1} such that sr = 1 (mod p).
The following theorem is presumably known to specialists, but we
have not been able to find a reference. The method of proof, however,
is standard.
Theorem 1. Assume that for some f ∈ G \ {1}, there exists an al-
gorithm D¯f to solve the DHP for base f , in running time T (f). Then
FAST DIFFIE HELLMAN AND MALICIOUS STANDARDS 3
for each g ∈ G \ {1}, there is an algorithm D¯g which solves the DHP
for base g in running time O(T (f) · log p).
Proof. Given g, there exists a unique r ∈ {1, . . . , p − 1} such that
g = f r.
Lemma 2. Given f r, we can compute f r
−1 mod p using at most 2 log p
queries to D¯f .
Proof. By Fermat’s Little Theorem, rp−1 = 1 (mod p), and therefore
rp−2 = r−1 (mod p).
We can compute f r
−1
= f r
p−2
using D¯f in a square-and-multiply man-
ner: Write p − 2 in base 2 as b0 + b1 · 2 + · · · + bn · 2
n, bn 6= 0
(then n ≤ log2 p). Let f0 = f
r. For each i = 1, 2, . . . , n compute
hi = D¯f (fi−1, fi−1), and let fi = hi if bn−i = 1, and fi = D¯f(hi, f0)
otherwise. Then fn = f
rp−2. 
Now, assume that we are given gx, gy and we wish to find gxy. Recall
that g = f r. Compute f r
−1
as in Lemma 2, and proceed with
D¯f (f
r−1, gy) = D¯f(f
r−1, f ry) = f r
−1ry = f y,
and
D¯f (g
x, f y) = D¯f(f
rx, f y) = f rxy = gxy. 
Remark 3 (Amplification). Theorem 1 generalizes to various other set-
tings. For example, assume that D¯f only solves the DHP with proba-
bility ǫ, i.e., for each z 6= xy (mod p),
Pr[¯Df(f
x, f y) = fxy] ≥ Pr[¯Df (f
x, f y) = f z] + ǫ.
Then D¯f can be transformed to an algorithm which succeeds in prob-
ability arbitrarily close to 1: Choose random r, s ∈ {1, . . . , p − 1},
compute fxr = (fx)r, f ys = (f s)y, and h = D¯f(f
xr, f ys). If the output
h was correct, then
h = fxrys = fxyrs.
Let t = (rs)−1 (mod p). Then, in the case of correct output h, ht =
fxy. We can repeat this O(1/ǫ2) times to get fxy as the most frequent
value almost certainly.
Having the algorithm transformed to one which succeeds in proba-
bility very close to 1, the arguments in the proof of Theorem 1 apply.
These assertions apply to all problems mentioned in this paper.
The closely related Discrete Logarithm Problem is much easier to
deal with: An algorithm DLh is said to solve the Discrete Logarithm
Problem (DLP) for base h if, for each x ∈ {1, . . . , p−1}, DLh(h
x) = x.
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Theorem 4. Assume that f ∈ G \ {1}, and there exists an algorithm
DLf to solve the DLP for base f , in running time T (f). Then for each
g ∈ G \ {1}, there is an algorithm DLg which solves the DLP for base
g in running time O(T (f)).
Proof. Given gx, find x using the following sequence of computations:
r = DLf(g), rx = DLf(f
rx) = DLf(g
x), s = r−1 mod p, and x =
srx. 
A closely related problem remains open: An algorithm DDHh is said
to solve the Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDH) for base h [1]
if, for each x, y, z ∈ {1, . . . , p − 1}, DDHh(h
x, hy, hz) = 1 if, and only
if, z = xy.
Problem 5. Assume that f ∈ G \ {1}, and there exists an algorithm
DDHf to solve the DDH for base f , in running time T (f). Does there
exist, for each g ∈ G \ {1}, an algorithm DDHg which solves the DDH
for base g in running time polynomial in T (f) · log p?
Remark 6. Menezes has pointed out to us that in [2] it is shown that
using 2 as a generator for certain discrete logarithm based signature
schemes is vulnerable to forgeries, whereas in [7] it is shown that using
a random generator in these schemes is provably secure (this is sum-
marized in [9]). This can be contrasted with the results of the current
section, and motivate the discussions in the remainder of the paper.
3. Malicious standards
One can still figure out models of security for which it is not clear
that using fast generators is as secure as using a random generator.
For example, assume that the following holds.
Scenario 7 (Malicious Diffie-Hellman (MDH)).
(1) There exist f ∈ G\{1}, a function F , and an efficient algorithm
D¯f such that for each x, y ∈ {1, . . . , p− 1},
D¯f (f
x, f y) = F (fxy).
(2) For a random g ∈ G\{1}, F (gxy) cannot be efficiently extracted
from gx and gy.
(3) For random x, y, F (fxy) has enough entropy to generate a key
for symmetric encryption (e.g., 80 bits).
Remark 8. While it seems unlikely that MDH could hold, we should
note that the field is full of surprises. For example, in [4] it is shown
that there are some groups where the Diffie-Hellman Problem is difficult
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and the Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem (see Section 2) is easy. See
Remark 6 for another example.
If MDH holds, then D¯f reveals some information on the agreed key
obtained by the Diffie-Hellman protocol using f as a generator. In
an extreme case, the function F could be the hash function which
Alice and Bob use to derive from fab a key for symmetric encryption.
However, in general it is not clear how to use D¯f to reveal the same
information gab for a random generator g. Of course, there is a random
r ∈ {1, . . . , p− 1} such that g = f r and therefore
D¯f(g
a, gb) = D¯f(f
ra, f rb) = F (f r
2ab) = F (grab),
but rab is a random element of {1, . . . , p−1} and independent of ab, so
this information is of no use. Similar assertions hold for the Discrete
Logarithm Problem.
Consequently, it might be the case that fast generators are not as
secure as random ones. While we are unable to prove the impossibility
of Scenario 7, we can show that if it is possible, then we cannot trust
given standards for the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol, unless
we know how they were generated.
Assume that MDH holds. Then an authority of standards can do
the following: Choose a uniformly random trapdoor t ∈ {1, . . . , p− 1},
compute g = f t, and suggest (G, p, g) as the standard’s parameters for
the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol. As t was uniformly random,
g is a uniformly random generator of G, so there is no way to know
that it was chosen in a malicious way. Now, assume that Alice sends
Bob ga and Bob sends Alice gb. For everyone else but the authority of
standards, deducing information on the agreed key gab is impossible.
Claim 9. For all a, b ∈ {1, . . . , p− 1}, the authority of standards can
compute F (gab) efficiently.
Proof. Using the trapdoor t, compute t−1 mod p, and (gb)t
−1
, which is
the same as f tbt
−1
= f b. Now, compute F (f rab) = D¯f(f
ra, f b). But
f rab = gab. 
Consequently, the authority of standards can decrypt the messages
sent between Alice and Bob.
In the appendix we indicate a possible positive consequence of the
MDH. We believe that many more can be derived from it. The proof of
the impossibility of MDH under mild hypotheses, or the construction
of a system for which MDH holds, are fascinating challenges.
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Remark 10. Galbraith has pointed out to us that there exist bit security
results which show that for various natural functions F , computing
F (gab) from ga and gb is as hard as the Diffie-Hellman Problem. See,
e.g., [8] and references [1,2] therein. This is an evidence for the difficulty
of establishing MDH.
Appendix A.
A public-key cryptosystem from the Malicious
Diffie-Hellman assumption
Assume that MDH holds for a group G with prime order p and
a generator f . Then we define the following public-key cryptosystem
for celebrities : In the intended application, we have some center (a
“celebrity”) sending messages to many recipients. The purpose is to
minimize the communication load of the center’s messages.
(1) G and p are publicly known.
(2) A celebrity, say Bob, chooses a random r ∈ {1, . . . , p− 1} and
publishes g = f r.
(3) Each one (say, Alice) who wishes to obtain in the future mes-
sages from Bob should choose a random a ∈ {1, . . . , p− 1} and
publish ga.
(4) When Bob wishes to encrypt a message to Alice, he computes
F (ga
2
) (using r he can do that, as shown in Section 3) and uses
some known hash function of the result as a key for a block
cipher with which he encrypts the message to Alice.
(5) Alice can compute ga
2
and thus decrypt the message.
(6) Users other than Bob who wish to send messages to one another
or to Bob can use standard algorithms like El-Gamal.
Note that the lengths of Bob’s encrypted messages is the same as that
of the plain messages.
Our suggested protocol is based on the difficulty of finding ga
2
given
ga. Menezes has pointed out to us that in Section 5.3 of [5] it is shown
that this is as difficult as the Diffie-Hellman Problem: Indeed, given ga
and gb, compute ga+b = ga · gb, and then compute ga
2
, gb
2
, and g(a+b)
2
.
Using these, compute
g2ab = g(a+b)
2
· (ga
2
)−1 · (gb
2
)−1.
Finally, compute gab = (g2ab)2
−1 mod p.
Remark 11. We can base a protocol with the same properties on clas-
sical assumptions: Bob publishes g and gb (for some random b of his
choice), and each other user, say Alice, publishes ga and computes a
hash value of gab to be used as symmetric key to decipher messages
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from Bob. Thus, our suggested protocol should only be considered as
an indication of the potential usefulness of MDH, which is not fully
understood yet.
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